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Parachute Payments in English Football; Softening the Landing or Distorting the 
Balance? 
Abstract 
This paper examines the impact of parachute payments in English league football in relation 
to the competitive balance of the second tier (the Championship). League results and 
parachute payment fees data were collected for the 11 seasons between 2006/07 and 2016/17. 
Overall competitive balance was analysed as well as specific aspects of competition that are 
fundamental to the league - promotion, survival and relegation. Our results show that an 
increase in the number of clubs with parachute payments and the overall value of these 
payments coincides with a reduction in competitive balance in the Championship. 
Furthermore, clubs with parachute payments are twice as likely to be promoted to the English 
Premier League and considerably less likely to suffer further relegation to the third tier 
(League 1). The paper therefore proposes either a re-distribution of parachute payments, the 
abolition of them completely, or a handicap points system to improve competitive balance.  
Keywords: competition, competitive balance, professional team sports, sport finance, 
English Premier League 
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Introduction 
The English domestic football league system is comprised of many different levels (tiers 1-8 
are generally the most recognised). However, within this system there are four main 
professional leagues; the English Premier League, the Championship, League 1 and League 2 
(anything below this level is officially classed as 'non-league'). The Championship in England 
is the country's second tier domestic league competition. Promotion from this league means 
entry into England's elite professional football league, the Premier League. At the time of 
writing, the English Premier League (hereafter referred to as the EPL) was the highest 
revenue generating league in European football grossing €4.4billion in 2014/15, €2billion 
ahead of its nearest rival the Bundesliga in Germany (Deloitte, 2016). Whilst the gap between 
the 'big five' leagues (England, Germany, Spain, Italy and France) and other leading 
European leagues continues to widen, the Championship is still relatively high on the list in 
revenue terms. Indeed, according to the latest figures available, the league is currently in the 
top ten revenue generating leagues in Europe with total revenues of £548m (Deloitte, 2016). 
This is due primarily to the broadcasting deals in place for EPL clubs and the central 
distribution mechanism to the lower leagues. The new EPL broadcasting deal that 
commenced at the beginning of the 2016/17 season is worth £5.1billion in UK rights alone, 
representing a 70% increase on the previous £3billion deal. In light of this increase, the club 
that finished bottom in the EPL in 2016/17 (Sunderland) earned £100million in broadcasting 
revenue under the current distribution mechanism. This figure - which is purely broadcasting 
income - is higher than the total revenue of the majority of clubs across the 'big five' 
European leagues - further underling the EPL's status as the richest league in world football. 
 The financial benefits and rewards of competing at the top table (i.e. the Premier 
League of respective European leagues) make it easy to see why clubs in the lower leagues 
aspire to gain promotion and compete in the elite league competition, especially when they 
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can increase their revenue tenfold. However, the reality of being relegated from the elite 
league is a dramatic fall in revenue and the possibility of financial distress for the clubs 
involved. To mitigate this risk, parachute payments are distributed to over half of the top 
leagues in Europe according to a report from the European Professional Football Leagues 
(2010). The aim of these parachute payments is primarily to soften the financial blow of 
relegated clubs no longer having access to the broadcasting money available to clubs in the 
top league. Of the leagues that distribute parachute payments, the EPL distributions to 
relegated clubs are substantially higher than others across Europe. Under the new 
broadcasting deal, parachute payments will total around £90million spread out across a three 
year period following relegation. For example, the three clubs relegated in 2015/16 season 
(Aston Villa, Newcastle United and Norwich City) each earned £40.9million for a year one 
parachute payment whilst competing in the Championship in 2016/17. To place this into 
further context, for the year end 2015, for the ten clubs in receipt of parachute payments 
(ranging from c.£10million-£25million each), these amounts comprised over half of their 
total combined revenue (Deloitte, 2016). Additionally, the average wages/revenue ratio for 
Championship clubs is currently 99%, with nine Championship clubs having wage costs 
greater than total revenue (Deloitte, 2016). 
 This suggests that clubs competing in the Championship are overspending in an 
attempt to reach the EPL although such levels of spending, particularly on player wages, 
poses a significant risk to clubs' medium to long-term viability with serious implications on 
the requirement for owner funding. Overspending in football is not necessarily a new 
phenomenon. Indeed, there have been a number of papers that have commented on this factor 
particularly where overspending has led to insolvency events in England and France (e.g. 
Scelles, Szymanski and Dermit-Richard, 2016; Szymanski, 2012). However, there has been 
much discussion over recent seasons about the effect of parachute payments on the 
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competitive balance of the Championship and how this links to the perception of 
overspending Championship clubs. Deloitte (2016) have stated that on-pitch competition 
remains intense in this division, although there is yet to be any scientific evidence to prove 
this point. Furthermore, there is little doubt that the parachute payments awarded to clubs that 
are relegated does provide them with a financial advantage over the majority of clubs in the 
division. A substantial amount of sports economics literature highlights the importance of 
competitive balance in league competitions. Indeed, the uncertainty of outcome hypothesis 
(UOH), pioneered by Rottenberg (1956) and Neale (1964), is an integral component of sports 
economics and suggests that increasingly imbalanced sports competitions have the potential 
to negatively influence fan interest and, consequently, stadium attendance and TV viewership 
figures (Pawlowski, 2013). As such, it can be argued that without competitive balance, the 
'product' (i.e. the football match) is less attractive. A less attractive 'product' subsequently 
cannot command a high price at market value so it is imperative that sports competitions and 
leagues remain competitively balanced with a degree of uncertainty of outcome. 
 It is acknowledged that there is also academic literature that refutes this claim when 
considering the concept of competitive intensity (e.g. Andreff & Scelles, 2015; Scelles, 
Durand, Bonnal, Goyeau & Andreff, 2013a, 2013b, 2016) although it must be noted that a 
full review of this literature is outside the scope of this paper given the focus of the enquiry. 
Indeed, Fort and Maxcy (2003) argued that there are two distinct strands of competitive 
balance research, namely ACB (analysis of competitive balance) and UoH (uncertainty of 
outcome hypothesis). The primary focus of ACB is to track trends in competitive balance 
over time and it is solely focused on sporting competition. UoH differs slightly as its primary 
focus is to consider the impact that competitive balance has on spectators and attendance 
figures. It is the former that this paper is concerned with and the literature review is 
positioned in such a way to reflect this. 
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 Thus, the primary aim of this paper is to attempt to provide empirical evidence on the 
debate surrounding competitive balance in the Championship by analysing whether or not the 
parachute payments awarded to clubs that are relegated have an effect on the competitive 
balance of the league itself. To the authors' knowledge, this is the first paper of its kind to 
consider the issue of competitive balance in relation to parachute payments. As such, the 
paper directly contributes to the growing field of sports economics literature. Furthermore, 
the findings of the paper have implications at policy level for both clubs and governing 
bodies with a view to safeguarding the prestige and viability of its domestic league 
competitions. The paper now presents the theoretical background to the study as well as 
previous literature on competitive balance in professional team sports before outlining the 
methodological approach taken. Following this, results are presented and discussed before the 
paper concludes with some recommendations. 
Theoretical framework and literature review 
The origins of competitive balance can be traced to literature on the economic structure of 
professional team sports and the joint nature of production. Most of the theoretical literature 
in this area covers the debate between the operating objectives of North American versus 
European team sports leagues and this forms the conceptual framework for our study. 
However, a full review of this literature is not deemed necessary here as the discussion will 
be well known to scholars in the field. Readers are referred to Dobson and Goddard (2011), 
Leach and Szymanski (2015) and Wilson, Plumley and Barrett (2015) for confirmation of this 
received theory. Consequently, the remainder of the literature review focuses on competitive 
balance literature and elements of English football that are relevant to our paper such as the 
escalation in  broadcasting rights deals and parachute payments. 
Competitive balance 
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As previously stated, there are two main streams of competitive balance research (Fort and 
Maxcy, 2003), namely ACB and UoH. Essentially, the concept of uncertainty of outcome, 
first pioneered by Rottenberg (1956) and Neale (1964), requires competition to be close to 
equal (i.e. either team in any one match has an equal chance of winning that match). 
Literature has argued that the premise of uncertainty of outcome can also have a significant 
effect on gate attendance and, more broadly, television viewing figures. For example, as the 
probability of either team winning approaches one, it is possible that gate receipts may fall 
substantially. Morrow (2003) believed this to be a significant problem for the football 
industry stating that if viewers perceive games as one-sided then viewing figures may fall 
accordingly. However, there is also evidence to the contrary, with some empirical studies 
suggesting that the majority of spectators prefer to see the home team play either an inferior 
team, where a win outcome is more likely (Buraimo & Simmons, 2008), or a perceived high-
quality 'big' team with a strong brand, such as Bayern Munich in an example from the 
German Bundesliga (Pawlowski &Anders, 2012). 
 There are similar contradictions in the literature regarding competitive balance 
research. For example, Pawlowski (2013) states that it may be that the empirical evidence is 
'wrong' because the proxies used to measure competitive balance are inadequate. In contrast, 
even if the empirical evidence is 'right', it does not necessarily show that competitive balance 
is irrelevant to football fans but rather that the variations in competitive balance that have 
actually been observed have not been large enough to affect demand. Pawlowski (2013) 
poses that a crucial question, from a fans perspective, is how unbalanced does a football 
league have to be before it matters? In the present day football industry, particularly in the 
major European leagues it appears that we are yet to see a tipping point. Match-day 
attendances remain high (the EPL has stadium capacity utilisation of 95%) and broadcasting 
rights deals continue to grow suggesting that football is still an attractive product to many 
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different forms of consumers across the globe. In light of this attractiveness, it is crucial that 
league organisers maintain some level of competitive balance, both within leagues and 
between leagues, in order to sustain interest and, subsequently, revenues.  
 Much like the early origins of sports economics literature, initial competitive balance 
literature focused on sports leagues in North America, primarily in Major League Baseball, 
but also in the National Basketball Association, the National Football League and the 
National Ice Hockey League (for examples see: Maxcy & Mondello, 2006; Zimbalist, 2002). 
Analysis on these leagues was a logical choice given that the framing of the league structures 
in North America were devised with competitive balance in mind and the majority of 
literature analysing these leagues does find high competitive balance. More recent studies 
have analysed the concept of competitive balance in relation to professional team sports in 
Europe, most notably in football but occasionally in other sports such as rugby union (e.g. 
Williams, 2012). Previous research examining competitive balance in football has almost 
exclusively focused on the so called 'big five leagues' (England, France, Germany, Italy and 
Spain) with one or two papers focusing on smaller leagues such as Austria and Switzerland 
(e.g. Pawlowski & Nalbantis, 2015). A further piece of research combines the above by 
analysing competitive balance across the entire football league structure (four divisions) in 
English football (Plumley, Ramchandani and Wilson, 2017). Aside from these papers, it 
appears that little attention has been given to football leagues in other European countries 
(Ramchandani, 2012). In relation to the findings of these studies, some detected no 
significant changes in competitive balance across European leagues (e.g., Goossens, 2006: 
German, French and Spanish first divisions; Groot, 2008: French and Spanish first divisions; 
Koning, 2000: Dutch first division; Michie & Oughton, 2004: French first division; 
Szymanski, 2001: English first division), whilst others reported a decline in competitive 
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balance (Goossens, 2006: English and Italian first divisions; Groot, 2008: English, German, 
Italian and Dutch first divisions; Montes, Sala-Garrido & Usai, 2014: Spanish first division).  
 There is also one further study of note that examines the competitive balance in 
relation to the UEFA Champions League (the flagship competition of club European football) 
(Plumley & Flint, 2015). In respect of this paper, the authors find that there are flaws in the 
ranking and seeding system used by UEFA and that, historically, the group stages of the 
Champions League have seen competitive imbalance. Furthermore, the seeding system 
continues to benefit the 'bigger' clubs in Europe and provides them with a greater opportunity 
of progression to the knockout rounds of the competition, thus, as the authors' state, 
maintaining the 'status quo' of the competition (Plumley & Flint, 2015). 
Broadcasting and the growth of commercial revenues 
Morrow (2003) proposed that football's relationship with TV is a paradox. On the one hand, 
television has been responsible for substantially increasing the revenues available in the game 
as a whole. At the same time it is those very revenues, or rather the manner in which they are 
shared out, that has most undermined competitive league balance and has led to the 
emergence of financially dominant leagues and financially dominant super clubs (Morrow, 
2003). Noll (2007) offers a similar argument, stating that television has vastly increased the 
revenues of the most popular sports and that most likely, increased television exposure has 
spurred growth in live attendance at matches and other sources of revenue as well (see Allan, 
2004; Baimbridge, Cameron & Dawson, 1995, 1996; Forrest, Simmons & Szymanski, 2004; 
Forrest, Simmons & Buraimo, 2005; Forrest & Simmons, 2006; Garcia & Rodriguez, 2002; 
Kuypers, 1996; Patton & Cooke, 2005; Price & Sen, 2003). 
 This has been evidenced in the way in which television revenues are distributed 
across different European leagues. In countries such as Spain for example, the distribution 
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mechanism has in the past been highly polarised, with clubs being able to negotiate their own 
deals with the broadcasters meaning that Real Madrid and Barcelona have been able to 
monopolise the market in recent years. Indeed, 2016-17, is the first multi-year rights cycle in 
Spain in which the rights have been sold collectively. There are other European leagues that 
distribute their broadcasting revenues more equally such as Austria, Bulgaria and Switzerland 
(EPFL, 2010). However, in relation to the 'big five' leagues in Europe, the EPL have 
distributed their revenues more equally than others in recent years, although the model still 
favours EPL clubs more so than clubs in the lower leagues in the UK. At the time of writing, 
fifty per cent of broadcasting rights in the EPL is divided equally among the clubs, twenty 
five per cent is distributed as merit payments (i.e. the higher the club finishes in the table, the 
more it receives), and twenty five per cent is on the basis of the number of appearances on 
television (Deloitte, 2015). This formula results in higher payments to the more successful 
clubs yet it is considerably fairer than the system in Spain's La Liga, for example, where 
Barcelona and Real Madrid alone earn almost half (48%) of the total revenue from 
broadcasting rights for the league under the previous rights cycle. 
 Major football broadcasting rights contracts have escalated substantially in recent 
years in English football. The first television contract signed in 1983 for just £5.2m (Gratton 
& Taylor, 2000) seems remarkably nondescript in relation to the more recent deals. In the 
years 2001-2004 domestic TV rights in the EPL were worth £450m which by the end of the 
2007-2009 deal had escalated to £1.7 billion. Despite commentators stating that it would be 
dangerous to assume that such increases could continue unabated (Beech, 2010) the value 
rose again in 2012 to £3 billion only for the record to be broken once again with a new deal in 
place for 2016-2019 worth £5.1 billion in UK rights alone which equates to a 70% increase 
on the previous deal (Swiss Ramble, 2015). The continual increase in broadcasting rights 
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appears to have expanded the gap between the EPL and the rest of the football league in the 
UK, particularly because clubs receive parachute payments if they are relegated from the EPL. 
 Whilst the majority of European football leagues have collective agreements in place 
for the sales of their broadcast rights, some are less equally distributed than others. The EPL 
has one of the most equal broadcast rights distribution system compared to its counterparts in 
Spain and Italy for example, yet there is still a substantial difference in the broadcast revenue 
paid to the club that finishes first in the EPL versus the club that finishes bottom. By way of 
an example, for the latest figures available, in 2016/17 EPL champions Chelsea received 
around £50million more from broadcasting rights fees than Sunderland who finished bottom 
of the table. This system is in contrast to the American team sport model, where in some 
sports broadcasting rights are distributed equally between all member clubs in the league. The 
primary focus of this approach is to maintain competitive balance within American sport 
leagues. It is clear that the broadcast distribution system in the EPL and the advent of 
parachute payments, despite being one of the most equal in European football, has altered the 
financial gap between the EPL and the football league in the present day English football 
industry. 
Solidarity and parachute payments 
In most European football leagues there are two forms of payment distributed from the 
highest standing league to the leagues and clubs below. These are solidarity payments and 
parachute payments and they are normally linked to the broadcasting rights deals negotiated 
by individual countries. This section will detail how these payments differ between different 
leagues in Europe before concluding with what we term as the 'unintended consequence' of 
parachute payments in English football. 
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 Recently, in light of the new broadcasting deal signed for English football that covers 
2016-2019 the EPL increased solidarity payments to the Football League and also introduced 
a mechanism that links the payments, which are made to all Championship, League One and 
League Two clubs, to the value of EPL broadcasting revenue. From 2016/17 onwards 
Football League clubs will receive solidarity payments which amount to a percentage of the 
value of a year 3 parachute payment. This is distributed as follows; Championship clubs will 
each receive 30% of the value of a year 3 parachute payment, League One clubs will each 
receive 4.5% and League Two clubs will each receive 3%. Under the new deal it is estimated 
that parachute payments will total c. £42million in year 1, c. £34million in year 2 and c. 
£15million in year 3, assuming the distribution mechanism remains similar to the previous 
deal. This means that 30% of a year 3 payment would then providing solidarity payments 
totalling around £4.5million for Championship clubs, £0.68million for League One clubs and 
£0.45million for League Two clubs.  
 The purpose of parachute payments in the EPL is to ensure that a club can cope with 
reduced income from not being part of the EPL and also the fact that many of the players 
remaining at the club will still be under contract on what is most likely to be higher wages 
that are often attributable to EPL players. In recent years, the value of parachute payments 
has increased primarily as a result of the growth in broadcasting rights deals (see table 1). 
Under the new broadcasting deal from 2016/17 onwards, parachute payments will be 
distributed to relegated clubs over a three-year period with the values equating to 55% of the 
equally distributed amount of media rights revenue for each EPL club in year 1, 45% of the 
equal share of broadcast revenue paid to EPL clubs in year 2, and 20% of the equal share of 
broadcast revenue paid to EPL clubs in year 3. Furthermore, promoted clubs that only last 
one year in the EPL will only receive parachute payments for years 1 and 2 post relegation. 
This means that parachute payments to individual clubs would be worth around £42million in 
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year 1, £34million in year 2 and £15million in year 3. In contrast, under the previous 
arrangement for the previous cycle, clubs received £48million in total across 4 years. For the 
latest figures available, the EPL distributed £219million in parachute payments in 2016/17 to 
eight clubs at an average of £27.4million per club. 
 Given the new parachute payments and solidarity payments in the EPL and Football 
League it is clear that there is a revenue disparity. Each club receives an estimated 
£4.5million in solidarity payments yet the three relegated clubs from the EPL will earn over 
six times that alone in parachute payments. Additionally, the majority of Championship clubs 
earn on average around £10-15million in revenue which is also dwarfed by a first year 
parachute payment. As such, the 'unintended consequence' of parachute payments may be 
that they are distorting the competitive balance in the Championship owing to a less equal 
revenue model amongst the 24 clubs. 
 By way of a comparison, it is also important to consider the amount of parachute 
payments distributed throughout other European leagues. One of the EPL's closest 
competitors in revenue terms, Serie A in Italy, provides parachute payments of €5million for 
the first season and €2.5million for the second season providing a club has been in Serie A 
for two or more seasons in a row prior to relegation. Of the others, neither Spain nor 
Germany offer parachute payments to clubs relegated from the top league and there is a 
greater financial disparity when considering some of the smaller European leagues. In Austria, 
for example, relegated clubs receive €110,000 in parachute payments if they conform to 
certain criteria and Denmark only offer marginally more with €300,000 paid to each club in 
parachute payments (EPFL, 2010). 
 The figures and discussion above prove that of the major leagues in European football, 
the EPL provides the greatest amount of parachute payments which is funded primarily 
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through its broadcasting rights deals. Furthermore, the EPL distributes most of that money to 
its member clubs with the additional parachute payments distorting the financial picture, in 
revenue terms, of the Football League Championship directly below. As such, the Football 
League Championship is a natural selection of focus for this study and we attempt to 
contribute to the academic literature on the debate by being the first paper of its kind, to the 
author's knowledge, to examine whether or not parachute payments affect the competitive 
balance of leagues. There have been a number of papers that have mentioned parachute 
payments although these have tended to focus on how parachute payments affect the finances 
of the clubs in general (e.g. Buraimo, Simmons & Szymanski, 2006; Moore & Levermore, 
2012), how the regulatory structure affects broadcasting rights deals and attendance (e.g. 
Forrest, Simmons & Szymanski, 2004; Sloane, 2015) and how the regulatory framework is 
viewed from a legal perspective (e.g. Serby, 2014). This study goes beyond the findings of 
these papers to consider whether or not parachute payments are affecting the competitive 
balance of the Football League Championship in English professional football. 
Research Questions 
This research had three aims. First, to examine the extent to which parachute payments widen 
or bridge the financial gap in the Championship between clubs that receive them and those 
that do not. Second, to analyse whether the overall competitive balance in the Championship 
is affected by the parachute payment system taking into account the prevalence and value of 
these payments. Third, to compare the performances of clubs in receipt of parachute 
payments and those without in terms of promotion to the Premier League (the top tier) and 
relegation to League 1 (the third tier) as well as the points differential between parachute 
payment clubs and other clubs in the Championship. 
Methods 
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The time frame for the analysis was the eleven Championship seasons from 2006/07 to 
2016/17. This time frame was chosen based on the availability of data about parachute 
payments made to clubs relegated from the Premier League, which was sourced via direct 
correspondence with the Premier League. It also coincides with the last three broadcasting 
cycles in the EPL and football league. Table 1 shows the number of Championship clubs in 
receipt of parachute payments (out of 24) in each of the eleven seasons and the total value of 
these payments. 
<Table 1 about here> 
 Turnover figures for clubs that competed in the Championship at any point in the time 
period under consideration were obtained from their annual accounts (up until the end of the 
2014/15 season owing to the availability of financial information which was sourced from 
Deloitte's annual review of football finance publication). Championship results for each 
season between 2006/07 to 2016/17 were collated from the English Football League website. 
Overall competitive balance of each season was measured using Michie and Oughton's 
(2004) Herfindahl Index of Competitive Balance (HICB), which was derived based on the 
number of points achieved by all clubs in the Championship in each season. We explicitly 
excluded any points deductions imposed on teams as this would have the potential to 
artificially skew the results of the research. For example, in the 2011/12 season Portsmouth 
were given a 10-point deduction for entering administration and their final points total in the 
official league table was 40.  However, they achieved 50 points based on their results which 
was the figure used in our analysis.   
There are a variety of measurement techniques when considering competitive balance in 
professional team sports and each has their own respective strengths and weaknesses (see 
Mills and Fort, 2014; Owen and King, 2015). Fort et al. (2016) review the empirical literature 
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on competitive balance including game and season uncertainty, primarily in the context of 
North American sports leagues. The most commonly used measure in studies of competitive 
balance in North American sports leagues, where drawn games are rare or non-existent, is the 
standard deviation of team winning percentage within a season. In sports like football, where 
drawn games are possible and common, winning percentage might be a biased indicator 
(Pawlowski et al., 2010). This paper utilises Mitchie and Oughton’s (2004) Herfindahl index 
of competitive balance (HICB) which is an industry standard measure adapted from 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index. This measure has been used in previous academic research 
focusing on football leagues (see for example, Lenten, 2008; Pawlowski et al., 2010; Plumley 
et al. 2017).  
 HICB scores were calculated using the formula (HHI / (1/N)) x 100, where HHI is the 
sum of the squares of the points share for each club contesting a league in a given season and 
N is the number of teams in that particular league and season. For a perfectly balanced league 
of any size, the index takes a value of 100. As the index rises, competitive balance declines.  
Pearson's correlation coefficient (r) was used to examine the pattern of HICB in the 
Championship over time as well as in relation to the prevalence of clubs with parachute 
payments and their total value. Time in this context refers to the seasons under review (so 
2006/07 = 1, 2007/08 = 2 and so on). Additional statistical tests were conducted to compare 
the promotion and relegation rates of clubs with and without parachute payments (z-test) and 
the points differential between parachute payment clubs and other clubs in the Championship 
(independent t-test).  
Results 
Club revenues 
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We first examined the revenues of clubs competing in the Championship that were in receipt 
of parachute payments compared with the revenues of other clubs competing in that league.  
This comparison was based on nine seasons for which annual accounts of the relevant clubs 
were available at the time of writing (from 2006/07 to 2014/15). We found that the average 
revenue generated per Championship club in receipt of parachute payments was £29.6m per 
annum. Around 44% of this amount was attributable to the value of the parachute payment 
(£12.8m per club) and 56% was from other sources (£16.7m). 
 On a standardised basis then, the average 'normal' (excluding parachute payment) 
revenue for clubs receiving parachute payment in the Championship was 23% (£3.9m) more 
than corresponding figure for other clubs in the league (£16.7m v £12.8m). Consequently, 
when we factor in the average value of parachute payments this financial gap is magnified 
further. The overall revenue per parachute payment club averaged across the nine seasons 
(£29.6m) was more than double the corresponding amount generated by other clubs (£12.8m). 
Hence it would appear that parachute payments offer clubs that are eligible to receive them a 
relative competitive advantage over other clubs in the sense that they can be used to offset 
player transfer fees and wages. 
 As shown in Table 2, in most cases (2006/07 - 2011/12) the parachute payments serve 
to widen the financial gap between parachute and non-parachute clubs. There are two 
occurrences (seasons 2012/13 and 2013/14) where the average revenue of clubs without 
parachute payments (excluding parachute payments for the clubs that had them) was higher 
although once parachute payments are accounted for then there has historically been a 
significant financial gap between parachute and non-parachute clubs. It is possible that this 
financial gap will increase in the future given the increase in parachute payments under the 
new broadcasting deal.  
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< Table 2 about here> 
Competitive balance 
In lieu of the previous findings, it is reasonable to conceive that parachute payments may 
distort the level of competitive balance in the Championship by virtue of providing certain 
clubs with greater financial resources with which to operate despite football industry analysts 
Deloitte in their annual review of football finance publications insisting that the 
Championship remains a competitive league. We build on this argument by analysing the 
overall competitive balance for each season of the Championship (measured using HICB) 
between 2006/07 and 2016/17, relative to the number of clubs in the league in receipt of 
parachute payments as well as the value of these payments. 
 Figure 1 shows the HICB scores for each season of the Championship in this time 
frame. The most balanced season using this indicator was 2012/13 (102.4) with the most 
imbalanced season being 2014/15 (107.2). 
<Figure 1 about here> 
 Over the last 11 seasons, there has been a moderately strong decline in competitive 
balance over time in the Championship as indicated by the upward slope of HICB scores (r = 
0.66). Even with a relatively small number of observations, this trend is also statistically 
significant (p = 0.03). Conversely, there has been a strong and statistically significant 
increase in both the number of clubs with parachute payments (r = 0.79, p = 0.00) and the 
total value of these payments (r = 0.93, p < 0.01) over time. The data underpinning these 
results is shown in Table 1 in the methods section. Even though the number of clubs in the 
Championship with parachute payments and their total value has increased over time, it is 
still only a minority of clubs that receive them. The most number of clubs in the 
19 
 
Championship to receive parachute payments in any one season was ten in 2014/15, which 
equates to 42% of all clubs in the league in that year. 
 Both the number of clubs with parachute payments and the total value of those 
payments are strongly correlated with HICB and these associations are statistically significant 
(r = 0.694, p = 0.018; and r = 0.753, p = 0.007 respectively). In other words, an increase in 
the number of clubs with parachute payments and in the overall value of these payments 
coincides with a reduction in competitive balance in the Championship.  
Comparative performance 
The previous analysis has focussed on how the overall level of competitive balance of the 
Championship has changed over time accounting for the relative influence of parachute 
payments made to clubs relegated from the Premier League. We now analyse the 
performance of clubs with parachute payments compared with those without in terms of the 
likelihood of being promoted to the top tier of English football (the Premier League), 
remaining in the second tier (the Championship) and being relegated to the third tier (League 
1). This comparative analysis is presented in Figure 2. 
<Figure 2 about here> 
 Overall nearly one in five Championship clubs in receipt of parachute payments in a 
given season gained promotion to the Premier League in the same year (i.e. they competed in 
the Premier League in the following season), either directly or via the play-offs. This statistic 
was as high as 40% in 2009/10. The 2010/11 season was the solitary occasion in the 11 year 
time frame under consideration when no clubs with parachute payments were promoted to the 
Premier League. Only four clubs in that season were in receipt of a parachute payment. For 
Championship clubs without parachute payments, the highest promotion rate was 15% (in 
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2010/11), which is less than the overall promotion rate for clubs with parachute payments. 
Clubs with parachute payments were almost twice as likely to be promoted to the Premier 
League compared to clubs without (18.7% v 10.0%) and the difference between these two 
proportions was found to be statistically significant (z = 1.968, p = 0.048).   
 Similarly, less than one in ten Championship clubs with parachute payments were 
relegated to League 1 (9.5%). The corresponding statistic for clubs without parachute 
payments was around 13.7%. The likelihood of relegation from the Championship was lower 
in the case of clubs with parachute payments compared to other clubs, although the difference 
between the relegation rates was not statistically significant at conventional levels (z = -0.932, 
p = 0.352). In five of the 11 seasons examined, no clubs with parachute payments were 
relegated from the Championship, whereas at least one club without these payments has been 
relegated to League 1 in every season.  
 When comparing the number of points won by parachute payment clubs (n=74) with 
those won by other clubs (n=190) in the Championship averaged across the 11 seasons, the 
mean difference was around five points (65.92 ± 15.31 points and 62.36 ± 13.57 points 
respectively). Using an independent samples t-test, this difference was found to be 
statistically significant (t(262) = 2.362, p = 0.019).  
Discussion 
In relation to overall competitive balance our findings are consistent with the findings of 
Goossens (2006), Groot (2008) and Montes et al. (2014) in the extant literature who all 
reported a decline in competitive balance in the English, Italian, German, Dutch and Spanish 
first divisions through their empirical work. Furthermore, the statistically significant results 
in relation to the number of clubs with parachute payments and the total value of those 
payments that are strongly correlated with HICB presents novel findings in relation to the 
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research agenda and poses some interesting discussion points that could be considered at 
policy level when measured against the theoretical underpinning sport leagues and 
competition. 
 If an increase in parachute payments is coinciding with a reduction in competitive 
balance in the Championship then there is an argument to suggest that this is conflicting with 
the fundamental principles of sport leagues such as uncertainty of outcome as pioneered by 
sport economists such as Rottenberg (1956) and Neale (1964). Furthermore, Leach and 
Szymanski (2015) and Dobson and Goddard (2011) stated that the elimination of competition 
within a sports league is not healthy for the continuing success of that league owing to the 
joint nature of production in professional team sports. Subsequently, there is evidence to 
suggest that the league(s) and governing bodies in England would be advised to re-visit the 
distribution mechanisms in relation to parachute payments in order to safeguard the levels of 
competition within the Championship in particular. 
 In relation to comparative performance these findings provide evidence to support the 
view that parachute payments provide clubs in the Championship that receive them with a 
competitive financial advantage, which is in turn reflected in their performance in the league 
relative to other clubs.  
 There is an argument here to suggest that, within the parameters of the English 
domestic football league system, the English Premier League is itself in fact creating a 
monopoly when compared with the other leagues in the system, a fact that Dobson and 
Goddard (2011) outlined was detrimental to the long-term viability of sport leagues. Our 
findings indicate that even if a club is relegated from the EPL it still has a higher chance on 
average of returning to that league over other clubs in the Championship owing in part to 
parachute payments. In the same way that Plumley and Flint (2015) argued that the seeding 
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and ranking system in the UEFA Champions League was maintaining the status quo, one 
could argue that the EPL is also maintaining the status quo in respect of the clubs that occupy 
the places within the league. The evidence so far suggests that it is very difficult for a non-
EPL club to gain promotion to that league and this will only be further compounded by future 
increases in parachute payments. 
 A further finding in relation to comparative performance was that there was a 
statistically significant difference in the mean number of points won by those clubs in receipt 
of parachute payments and those that are not. This mean difference was around five points in 
total. With this in mind, there could be a proposal here for a handicap system to be applied in 
the Championship which may negate the financial advantage gained by clubs in receipt of 
parachute payments and improve competitive balance. For example, if the mean differential 
in terms of points gained by clubs in receipt of parachute payments is five points, we propose 
a handicap system whereby relegated clubs select either to have parachute payments and 
begin on minus five points or to not have the parachute payments and begin on zero points 
like all other clubs in the league. To the author's knowledge, this is not something that has 
been discussed before within the English football league system. 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, our paper presents three main findings. First, the descriptive analysis of clubs' 
finances indicates that parachute payments offer clubs that are eligible to receive them a 
relative financial competitive advantage over other clubs in the sense that they can be used to 
offset player transfer fees and wages. Second, in relation to the competitive balance of the 
Championship, we have provided empirical evidence that an increase in the number of clubs 
with parachute payments and the overall value of these payments coincides with a reduction 
in competition in the league. Furthermore, the competitive balance of the league in general 
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has declined in recent years. Third, in relation to comparative performance, Championship 
clubs with parachute payments are twice as likely to be promoted to the EPL compared to 
clubs without and considerably less likely to suffer further relegation to League One 
compared with other clubs in the league. These findings not only extend the evidence base of 
competitive balance in professional team sports but also contribute to the academic literature 
in a novel way, primarily by being the first paper of its kind to examine parachute payments 
in relation to competitive balance. 
 As such, there are three main recommendations that we propose could be 
implemented at policy level to potentially safeguard the long-term viability of the league 
structure in English professional football. First, a re-distribution of parachute payments is 
recommended to bridge the financial gap between the leagues. Solidarity payments paid to 
Championship, League 1 and League 2 clubs are dwarfed by parachute payments and also by 
the central broadcasting money to EPL clubs which creates an immediate financial disparity 
between the EPL and Football League. A more equal distribution of the broadcasting rights, 
suggested by Noll (2007) in relation to improving competitive balance of leagues, would 
possibly begin to bridge the financial gap between some clubs.  
 Second, the implementation of a handicap system could offer a solution to give clubs 
the choice as to whether they want to receive parachute payments and take a points deduction 
or whether or not they really need the parachute payment in the first place and are happy to 
refuse payment and start the league season in the same position (in terms of points) as other 
clubs in the league. This concept is exploratory in nature and has some flaws but it would 
provide a novel aspect to competition and might make league governance structures think 
more deeply about the purpose of parachute payments if clubs were to refuse them. 
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 Third, we propose an abolition of the parachute payment system entirely. Its premise 
in the early years was to soften the financial blow of relegation but in light of increasing 
broadcasting fees all it appears to have done is to give relegated teams a significant financial 
advantage over their competitors which often transfers into a competitive advantage on the 
pitch, thus making it extremely difficult for clubs not in receipt of parachute payments to gain 
promotion to the EPL. Our paper confirms this theory through statistically significant results 
and presents a strong evidence base for the abolition of the current system.  
 The practical problem with such recommendations is that there are power issues at 
governance level within the English game and also power struggles at individual clubs 
particularly within the EPL. The Football Association (FA) is the governing body of English 
football and holds jurisdiction over the EPL and Football League which are merely 
competition organisers. However, both the EPL and Football League have their own 
rulebooks that participants must adhere too. This creates a power struggle because the EPL 
has essentially created a self-regulating league through the collective selling of its own 
broadcasting rights and commercial deals which has also led to self-sustaining powerful 
'super clubs' that monopolise the market to some extent. While ever this structure exists, it is 
difficult to imagine a point at which the financial balance would begin to be redressed. A 
further caveat is that even if certain regulations in terms of league structure and distribution 
mechanisms were altered, it is conceivable that the financially dominant super clubs within 
the EPL would breakaway and form a European Super League (a realistic threat to domestic 
competitions), thus creating a perceived less attractive product in relation to the EPL itself. 
 The point of Pawlowski (2013) is a pertinent place to conclude. How unbalanced does 
a league have to be before it matters? In the English Football League system, it appears that 
we are yet to reach a tipping point and there is an argument to suggest that if broadcasting 
rights deals continue to rise then there will only be further imbalance in the future. This is all 
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very well, providing English football maintains its attractiveness as a product to both its local 
and global markets, but if competitive balance really is a fundamental premise of league 
structure and competition then the evidence suggests that a change in tactics may be required. 
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